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Abstract
The neural correlates of lying about affective information were studied using a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) methodology. Specifically, 13 healthy right-handed Chinese men were instructed to lie about the valence, positive or
negative, of pictures selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) while their brain activity was scanned by
a 3T Philip Achieva scanner. The key finding is that the neural activity associated with deception is valence-related.
Comparing to telling the truth, deception about the valence of the affectively positive pictures was associated with activity
in the inferior frontal, cingulate, inferior parietal, precuneus, and middle temporal regions. Lying about the valence of the
affectively negative pictures, on the other hand, was associated with activity in the orbital and medial frontal regions. While
a clear valence-related effect on deception was observed, common neural regions were also recruited for the process of
deception about the valence of the affective pictures. These regions included the lateral prefrontal and inferior parietal
regions. Activity in these regions has been widely reported in fMRI studies on deception using affectively-neutral stimuli.
The findings of this study reveal the effect of valence on the neural activity associated with deception. Furthermore, the
data also help to illustrate the complexity of the neural mechanisms underlying deception.
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Introduction
Sometimes, we need to withhold the truth, whether for malicious
or benign reasons. This act of withholding a true fact is termed
‘‘deception’’ [1,2]. The involvement of brain processes in the
manipulation of information suggests that brain activity during
deception and truth telling should be different. It is this very
assumption that founds the theoretical basis of neuroimaging studies
on deception. Langleben et al. [3], Lee et al. [4], and Spence et al.
[5] were among the first to apply functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) methodology to deception research. Using different
experimental tasks in their studies of deception, they observed that
activity in the prefrontal, cingulate, and parietal regions is associated
with lying (increased brain activity during lying, relative to a truth-
telling control). Other studies revealed that a number of these
regions are implicated in a range of cognitive processes, such as
executive control, working memory, attention, and inhibition
[6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13]. These results, which were corroborated in
later functional neuroimaging research on deception [14,15,16,17],
provided empirical evidence to support the insight from behavioral
studies that deception is a complex and cognitively effortful task that
demands a large amount of cognitive control and numerous mental
management mechanisms [18].
The fMRI deception studies reviewed thus far offer insights into
the brain activity associated with deception about affectively-
neutral stimuli. However, little attention has been paid to the effect
on brain activity when lying involves affective information. This
represents a significant gap in the research, as the emotional
attributes of suppressed information could have a very significant
impact on deceptive responses. Recently, Abe [19] employed
positron emission tomography methodology to study the neural
responses associated with deception in social interactions and
reported activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala
regions. Spence et al. [20] elaborated on their previous studies
[5,17] and examined the neural activity associated with lying
about past life events that the participants regarded as ‘‘embar-
rassing’’. Lying was found to induce significant activity in the
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (Brodmann’s Area [BA] 45 & 47);
such activity tends to be associated with self-control and regulation
[21,22,23]. In these studies, the deceptions were low stake. Spence
et al. [24] reported the fMRI findings of a case study on deception
involving a woman with possible Munchausen’s syndrome by
proxy who had been convicted of poisoning her child. They
reported significant BOLD signals in the ventrolateral prefrontal
and anterior cingulate regions. In this case study, both the content
of the experimental materials used (i.e. whether she had poisoned
a child) and the context of the deception (i.e. her wish to prove her
innocence) could be emotion-provoking and high stake.
Indeed, on many social occasions, we may need to lie about the
valence of a stimulus we encounter for reasons of social courtesy or
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in consideration of the feelings of others. Ganis et al. [15] found
that distinct neural networks support different types of deception,
depending, for instance, on whether a lie is well-rehearsed or
spontaneously made up. Furthermore, there is abundant evidence
that emotional materials of different valence are processed
differently in the brain [25,26,27,28,29,30]. Mak et al. [31], for
example, reported that the regulation of positive and negative
emotions involves common as well as distinct neural correlates.
Specifically, they observed that the regulation of positive emotions
was associated with changes to the BOLD signals in the left dorsal
prefrontal regions and in the left insula, amygdala, right rolandic
operculum, and lingual gyri regions. In contrast, the regulation of
negative emotions was associated with brain activity in the left
orbitofrontal gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate
gyrus, left middle occipital gyrus, and right precuneus regions.
Given all of the data reviewed, the study reported here
examined low-stake deception. We investigated whether lying
about the valence of affective stimuli involves activity in the
frontal, cingulate, and parietal regions, as has been observed in
deception studies using affectively neutral stimuli. Furthermore,
we examined whether lying about the valence of stimuli involves
distinct neural correlates, as has been observed in the study of
emotion regulation. We employed the widely used International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) as the experimental stimuli [32].
The IAPS comprises a large set of standardized, emotionally
evocative color photographs that are known to reliably induce
emotional experiences. The stimulus set was tailored for each
participant according to their rating of a set of affective pictures,
which they selected from the IAPS, as either positive or negative.
Orthogonal to this, the participants were cued to respond to each
picture in either a truthful or a dishonest manner; for example,
when cued to lie and presented with a negative picture, they had to
respond that the picture was positive. Behaviorally, we would
expect to perceive a typical ‘‘lie effect’’, namely a significantly
longer response time for the lie trials than for the truth trials. With
regard to the neural correlates, we hypothesized that the regions
associated with lying about positive and negative valence materials
would be distinct from each other. Finally, based on the findings of
the majority of imaging studies on deception, including our own
work, we expected to find deception-related activations in the
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and inferior parietal regions.
Results
Behavioral findings
Accuracy. The mean accuracy rate of all the participants
reached over 95%. A 2-way ANOVA repeated-measures model
was employed to explore the effects of the Lie versus True
condition and the effect of valence perception on accuracy.
Significant main effect of neither Lie/True (F1,25 = 0.59; p=0.449)
nor valence (F1,25 = 1.47; p=0.237) was observed. The interaction
effect of the two factors was also nonsignificant (F1,25 = 1.51;
p=0.230). The mean accuracy rate was the same for both the Lie
and True conditions.
Reaction times. A 2-way repeated-measures ANOVA model
was employed to examine the participants’ reaction times. A
significant main effect of the Lie and True conditions (F1,25 = 7.24;
p=0.013) and a robust interaction effect of Lie/True and valence
perception (F1,25 = 27.49; p,0.001) were observed. The main
effect of valence perception was nonsignificant (F1,25 = 0.71;
p,0.406). A pair-wise comparison showed that the only
significant difference between the Lie and True conditions was
in relation to positive valence perception (t=4.7; p,0.001), with a
longer reaction time in the Lie (M=669.09; SD=157) than the
True (M=578.15; SD=151.83) condition. The difference between
the positive and negative valence was significant in both the Lie
and True conditions, with a longer reaction time when
participants were lying about positive (M=669.09; SD=157)
rather than negative (M=631.71; SD=132.81) valence (t=2.788;
p,0.01). On the other hand, when the participants were telling the
truth, they took longer to respond when they were perceiving
negative (M=638.78; SD=133.31) rather than positive
(M=578.15; SD=151.83) IAPS pictures, which is consistent
with the findings of previous research that the processing time for
stimuli charged with negative valence tends to be longer due to
emotional negativity bias [33,34,35,36,37].
Imaging results
Validity of the paradigm: Neural correlates of viewing the
IAPS pictures. By contrasting positive and negative valence in
the truthful condition, we observed stronger BOLD signals in the
areas of the superior frontal gyrus (BA 9), middle cingulate gyrus
Table 1. Brain regions with significant BOLD activity in the
contrasts of Positive and Negative valence in the True
condition.
Regions BA Side MNI Coordinates Cluster T
x y z
Positive.Negative (True condition)
Superior Frontal 9 R 18 44 32 279 4.32
Superior Medial Frontal 32 L 216 38 26 22 3.19
Middle Cingulum 23 L 210 246 36 12 2.03
Insula 45 R 34 36 10 79 2.71
Fusiform 37 R 34 248 212 69 2.95
Putamen 48 L 230 218 10 177 4.52
Negative.Positive (True condition)
Superior Frontal 6 R 32 0 64 17 3.93
Superior Medial Frontal 9 R 6 48 34 27 3.4
Inferior Frontal Triangular 44 R 54 22 26 62 4.5
45 R 54 24 0 23 3.92
Inferior Orbital Frontal 47 R 32 26 22 45 4.88
Anterior Cingulate 2 R 8 14 24 19 3.5
Middle Cingulum 32 R 10 30 36 281 4.93
Precentral 6 L 236 6 44 917 5.73
Supplementary Motor Area 6 L 210 6 50 31 4.07
Inferior Parietal 40 L 238 240 48 159 4.39
40 R 44 254 48 16 4.19
Precuneus 7 L 24 270 44 1083 6.86
Lingual 27 R 18 238 0 48 3.59
19 R 24 256 4 18 3.38
Middle Temporal 37 R 50 270 8 79 4.7
21 R 46 248 12 125 4.6
Thalamus - R 6 210 20 20 3.44
Notes: All of the listed brain regions were cluster corrected at 12 contiguous
voxels and meet the threshold of p,0.05. The x, y, z coordinates are the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. BA is the abbreviation for the
approximate Brodmann’s areas; L is left; R is right. Cluster Size is the number of
voxels activated in the regional cluster; T is the t2values of the suprathreshold
voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.t001
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(BA 23), and insula (BA 45) during the perception of positive IAPS
pictures; whereas the BOLD signals were stronger in the areas of
the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47 & 48), middle temporal gyrus (BA
21, 37, & 39), and anterior cingulate (BA 24) when the participants
perceived negative pictures (Table 1, Figure 1). The observed
activation patterns were consistent with the findings of previous
studies that indicate activity in the dorsal and medial prefrontal,
cingulate gyrus, and insula regions during the perception of
positive emotions [38,39,40] and activity in the temporal gyrus,
ventral prefrontal, and the anterior cingulate during the
perception of affectively negative stimuli [38,39,41].
Deception versus truth telling. The BOLD signals in the
left superior medial frontal (BA 9), left inferior frontal (BA 45), left
middle frontal (BA 46), left middle cingulum, bilateral insula (BA
47/48), left precentral (BA 9), bilateral inferior parietal (BA 40),
left lingual (BA 37), and right thalamus were stronger for deception
than truth telling. On the other hand, stronger activation was
observed in the right inferior frontal (BA 6), left superior frontal
(BA 6), right postcentral (BA 3 & 5), right calcarine (BA 18), and
right middle occipital (BA 19) in the True condition than in the Lie
condition (Table 2).
Deception of positive valence. Lying about the valence of
the positive pictures was associated with activity in the areas of
the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45), right middle frontal gyrus
(BA 45 & 6), left middle cingulum gyrus (BA 23), right inferior
parietal gyrus (BA 40), bilateral lingual (BA 19 & 30), right
precuneus (BA 7), and bilateral middle temporal gyrus (BA 21 &
22). Activity in these regions has been observed in many
neuroimaging studies of deception [42]. Furthermore,
significant BOLD signals were observed in the visual perceptual
system, the right calcarine (BA 17), and left superior occipital
gyrus (BA 23) when the participants were lying about positive
valence. Areas related to emotion processing, namely the left
hippocampus (BA 27), left caudate, and right thalamus, were also
significantly activated (Table 3, Figure 2).
Deception about negative valence. When deception about
pictures of negative valence was called for, significant BOLD
signals were observed in the left superior frontal gyrus (BA 9), left
inferior orbital frontal gyrus (BA 47), left superior medial frontal
gyrus (BA 8), and left lingual (BA 37) areas (Table 3, Figure 2).
Valence-related effect on deception. A comparison of the
BOLD signals associated with lying about positive valence, relative
to that about negative valence, revealed significantly stronger
signals in the bilateral middle frontal gyrus (BA 45 & 46), left insula
(BA 48), left posterior cingulum (BA 29), left thalamus, left
caudate, bilateral lingual gyrus (BA 18 & 19), right rolandic
operculum (BA 48), right fusiform (BA 37), right superior occipital
gyrus (BA 18), and left calcarine (BA 17) regions (Table 4,
Figure 3). On the other hand, stronger BOLD signals were
observed in the bilateral middle temporal gyrus (BA 37 & 39),
bilateral middle frontal gyrus (BA 44 & 45), bilateral thalamus, left
angular gyrus (BA 39), right precuneus (BA 29), left hippocampus
(BA 30), and right calcarine (BA 19) when the deception about the
valence was associated with negative IAPS pictures (Table 4,
Figure 3). Comparing to lying about negative valence, it appears
that lying about positive valence is associated with more extensive
neural activity.
Common neural correlates of deception about affective
stimuli. We examined the neural regions in which activity was
associated with deception about the valence of the affectively
positive and negative pictures using the conjunction analysis
procedure. We observed that the brain areas of the superior
frontal gyrus (BA 9/10), superior medial frontal gyrus, inferior
orbital frontal gyrus (BA 47), and angular gyrus (BA 39) were
significantly activated (Table 5, Figure 4).
Discussion
Using affectively positive and negative IAPS pictures, we studied
the neural activity associated with lying about the valence of these
pictures. The pattern of brain activity when the participants were
viewing these IAPS pictures was consistent with that reported in
previous literature, thus confirming the validity of the paradigm
and hence the findings of the study.
Figure 1. Brain activation map contrasting Positive versus Negative valence in the True condition. 1a: True: Positive.Negative. 1b:
True: Negative.Positive. Notes: A =Anterior view; P = Posterior view; R = Right hemisphere; L = Left hemisphere; V =Ventral view; D=Dorsal view’.
‘‘True’’ represents the ‘‘True condition’’. ‘‘Negative’’ represents the ‘‘Negative valence condition’’; ‘‘Positive’’ represents the ‘‘Positive valence
condition’’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.g001
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The key finding is that the neural activity associated with
deception is valence-related. In this study, compared to telling the
truth, deception about the valence of the affectively positive
pictures was associated with activity in the brain regions (inferior
frontal region, cingulum, inferior parietal, precuneus, and middle
temporal regions) commonly reported in neuroimaging studies on
deception [5,12,16,42,43,44,45,46,47,48], together with activity in
the visual perceptual system (BA 17) and the limbic-related regions
(the amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, and posterior cingulate
(BA 29)). Deception about the valence of negative pictures, on the
other hand, was associated with activity in the orbital and medial
frontal regions (BA 47 & 8), regions that are associated with
emotion regulation [31,49,50]. A clear valence-related effect on
deception was observed. Behaviorally, the lie effect, defined as the
increased mean reaction time for the ‘‘lie’’ trials relative to the
‘‘true’’ trials, was significantly larger for positive pictures than for
negative pictures, demonstrating a clear modulation effect of
stimulus valence on deception. Together with the observed
behavioral results, activity in different brain regions was involved
when the participants were lying about the valence of positive (BA
7, 21, 22, 23, 40, & 45) and negative (BA 37 & 47) IAPS pictures.
These results add to the existing knowledge of the role of emotion
in deception [19] and, specifically, the valence-related effect on the
neural activity associated with deception. The findings of this study
help to illustrate the complexity of the neural mechanisms of
deception.
While there is a clear valence-related effect on deception,
common neural regions are also recruited (BA 8, 9, 39, & 47)
during deception regardless of whether the deception involves
positive or negative pictures. In other words, deception involving
affective stimuli requires the collaboration of more brain regions
than deception involving affectively neutral stimuli.
Deception studies that have used affectively neutral stimuli have
often identified a higher level of brain activity during deception
than during truth telling. This study used affective stimuli and
observed that BOLD signals in the frontal-occipital regions were
stronger during truth telling than during deception. This pattern of
findings may relate to the participants having been engaged in a
deeper level of perception during the True condition than during
the Lie condition when affective stimuli were involved.
Valence-related effect on the neural correlates of
deception
Positive valence. Deception about positive valence was
associated with activity in regions of the emotion system. For
men, activity in the thalamus appears to be associated with viewing
Table 3. Brain regions with stronger BOLD activity in the Lie
condition than in the True condition when perceiving Positive






Inferior Frontal 45 L 242 30 14 4951 8.11
Inferior Orbital Frontal 47 R 34 24 24 2081 4.48
Middle Frontal 45 R 50 42 18 17 3.05
6 R 36 2 60 53 2.57
Middle Cingulum 23 L 22 216 28 30 2.8
Precentral 6 R 18 216 74 12 2.19
Inferior Parietal 40 R 50 246 40 1320 5.28
Lingual 19 L -20 264 2 219 3.23
30 R 16 242 28 135 2.88
Precuneus 7 R 8 262 46 74 2.66
Middle Temporal 22 L 248 252 24 1378 5.04
21 R 54 238 0 509 3.51
Superior Occipital 23 L 220 264 28 16 2.13
Calcarine 17 R 16 268 8 155 2.61
Hippocampus 27 L 222 230 0 380 4.27
Caudate - L 214 8 14 66 3.76
Thalamus - R 6 26 16 56 3.63
Lie.True (Negative valence)
Superior Frontal 9 L 214 56 30 45 3.8
Superior Medial Frontal 8 L 28 34 48 13 2.03
Inferior Orbital Frontal 47 L 232 24 210 15 2.44
Lingual 37 L 222 244 0 17 2.6
Notes: All of the listed brain regions were cluster corrected at 12 contiguous
voxels and meet the threshold of p,0.05. The x, y, z coordinates are the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. BA is the abbreviation for the
approximate Brodmann’s areas; L is left; R is right. Cluster Size is the number of
voxels activated in the regional cluster; T is the t-values of the suprathreshold
voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.t003
Table 2. Brain regions with significant BOLD activity in the
contrasts of Lie and True conditions.
Regions BA Side MNI Coordinates Cluster T
x y z
Lie.True
Superior Medial Frontal 9 L 22 56 34 1466 4.66
Inferior Frontal 45 L 242 32 16 291 5.02
Middle Frontal 46 L 236 26 38 31 2.7
Middle Cingulum 2 L 216 24 44 29 2.84
Insula 47 L 230 30 4 211 4.64
48 R 46 4 24 42 2.8
Precentral 9 L 238 10 44 47 3.11
Inferior Parietal 40 L 240 246 50 75 3.7
40 R 58 248 42 145 3.63
Lingual 37 L 222 242 22 164 4.2
Thalamus - R 18 226 8 38 2.69
True.Lie
Superior Frontal 6 L 216 4 52 233 3.98
Inferior Frontal 6 R 56 10 18 107 3.38
Postcentral 5 R 22 246 66 160 2.78
3 R 46 218 38 28 2.54
Calcarine 18 R 18 278 10 159 2.58
Middle Occipital 19 R 36 270 34 174 2.51
Notes: All of the listed brain regions were cluster corrected at 12 contiguous
voxels and meet the threshold of p,0.05. The x, y, z coordinates are the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. BA is the abbreviation for the
approximate Brodmann’s areas; L is left; R is right. Cluster Size is the number of
voxels activated in the regional cluster; T is the t-values of the suprathreshold
voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.t002
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affective pictures [51,52]. In the frontal regions, significant BOLD
signals were observed in the lateral prefrontal area. Activity in
these regions has been reported in previous studies on the
regulation of positive emotion [31,53]. Activity in the insula can
relate to self-induced or internally generated emotions, and
recalled emotions can activate the insula [54,55]. At the same
time, the insula monitors the ongoing internal emotional state of
the organism [56] via extensive multi-modal sensory inputs and
reciprocal connections with the cingulate gyrus, orbitofrontal
cortex, and other limbic structures [57,58].
Activity related to self-monitoring and the regulation of
responses, processes which are essential to the act of deception,
was also observed. Specifically, we observed significant BOLD
signals in the caudate and posterior cingulum, which were also
reported in our previous deception study [4]. Activity in the
caudate and posterior cingulum is likely to be related to the
regulation of habitual responses governed by previously learned
rules and hence to monitoring the accuracy of performance [8,59].
Semrud-Clikeman et al. [60] reported that the intact structure of
the caudate correlates with the performance of measures relating
to inhibition. Furthermore, Amos et al. [59] reported increased
errors in performance when activation units representing striatal
neurons are reduced, as observed in people with either Parkinson’s
or Huntington’s disease. These findings suggest an important role
for the caudate in the inhibition of habitual response and the
monitoring of error performance associated with deceptive
responses. Maguire et al. [61] proposed that the posterior
cingulum links incoming information with the activated knowledge
representation, hence forming an integrated representation of the
discourse.
The stronger activity in the visual-perceptual system during
deception about positive valence could be explained by the fact
that, when engaging in deception, participants spend more time
viewing positive pictures than negative pictures.
Negative valence. Deception about negative valence was
also associated with activity in the thalamus. Again, in our
previous study, activity in the thalamus was associated with
emotion perception in men, regardless of the valence of the stimuli
[51]. Activity in the middle frontal (BA 45) and the inferior parietal
(BA 29 & 39) regions was also observed. Activity in these regions
has been widely reported in imaging studies on deception by
ourselves and others [4,5,62]. Prior research has shown that the
precuneus is involved in the recollection of past events and, in
particular, the retrieval of rich episodic contextual associations
[63]. In this context, the higher activity we observed in the
precuneus may relate to the recollection of negative affective
events in the past associated with viewing the negative pictures.
Activity in the limbic-related region, the hippocampus, further
suggests the possibility of the recollection of an emotional memory
and hence increased emotional arousal when viewing the negative
pictures. The speculation regarding heightened emotional arousal
is corroborated by the activity in the middle temporal and
calcarine regions, which is likely to be associated with visual
perception or pattern recognition associated with perceiving the
IAPS pictures [64]. Although the participants were less willing to
spend time viewing the negative pictures than they were viewing
the positive pictures, the occipital and temporal activity was
stronger when they were viewing the negative pictures. Following
this line of thought, if the excessive emotional response needed to
be modulated in order for the deception to be carried out, the
lateral prefrontal and the inferior parietal regions may have been
recruited for this purpose to provide top-down modulation
[6,22,50,65].
Valence-related effect. The patterns of the BOLD signals
associated with deception about positive and negative valence
appear to have been distributed in the dorsal and ventral brain
regions of the emotion system, respectively. According to Phillips
et al. [66], the ventral brain regions are important for the rapid
appraisal of emotional material, the production of affective states,
and autonomic response regulation, whereas the dorsal brain
regions are important for the intentional regulation of the resulting
affective states. Interpreting the imaging data in keeping with this
Figure 2. Brain activation map contrasting Lie versus True in Positive and Negative valence. 2a: Lie.True for Positive valence. 2b:
Lie.True for Negative valence. Notes: A =Anterior view; P = Posterior view; R = Right hemisphere; L = Left hemisphere; V = Ventral view; D=Dorsal
view.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.g002
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line of thought, it appears that deception about positive valence
places demands on the emotion regulation system and requires the
conscious regulation of the affective state. In contrast, lying about
negative valence appears to be associated with the more
subconscious processes involved in the appraisal, production,
and realignment of the internal affective states.
Common neural correlates. With regard to deceptive
responses involving affective stimuli, neural activation was
observed in the lateral and medial prefrontal regions and the
parietal regions, which is consistent with the findings reported in
prior imaging studies on deception [3,4,5,12,16]. The functional
roles of these regions in relation to deception have been reported
in these prior imaging studies.
Neural correlates of deception
Taking into consideration the findings in this study using
affective stimuli and in other studies using affectively neutral
stimuli [67,68], the activity in the frontal (lateral and medial) and
parietal regions is robust in the act of deception, regardless of
whether the stimuli used are affectively loaded or affectively
neutral. On top of the neural platform of activity associated with
deception, task-specific neural activity was also observed. The
patterns of the BOLD signals observed during deception about the
valence of the positive and negative pictures were similar to those
observed in previous studies, by ourselves and others, of the
emotion regulation of positive and negative emotions [31,65,69].
Limitations and conclusion
The methodological limitations of this study should be
acknowledged. A measure of arousal was not included in this
study due to time and resource constraints. Future studies should
consider investigating how arousal may modulate deception-
related neural activity when the content and/or context of
deception are/is affective in nature. As we used a simulated
design that involved minimum stakes and induced no guilt or
anxiety [3], this study could not reveal the emotional reactions
involved in real-life deceptions. In addition, emotion is a
multidimensional construct, and this study limited its scope to
varying the valence of emotional stimuli. Other dimensions –
including individual variation in the intensity of perceiving the
emotional attributes of a given stimulus, the nature of the lie
employed, and the emotional influence introduced by changes in
the interview procedures – were not investigated. The artificial
setting of the study, which involved minimum stakes when the
participants lied, limits the generalizability of the findings to more
applied settings. Deception in the real world is far more
sophisticated than the deception in our experiments.
Notwithstanding the study’s limitations, it offers some early
insights into the potentially important interactions between
cognition and emotion during deception. Accordingly, our
findings begin to fill the theoretical gap in the current imaging
research on deception, which has hitherto mainly focused on
cognitive processes. Increased response time and activity in the
frontal-parietal regions appear robust during deception, regardless
of whether affective or affectively neutral stimuli are used. Neural
activity in areas other than the frontal-parietal regions could be
related to the processing of the stimuli’s affective nature.
In this study, the deception-related brain activation patterns
associated with materials of positive and negative valence were
significantly different. This extends previous findings [15] and
indicates that the neural correlates of deception depend not only
on the type of lie, but also on the emotional valence of the subject
content of the lie. Our findings provide an initial platform upon
which future studies may build while attempting to understand the
influence of emotional context on deceptive behavior. For
example, it would be of theoretical and practical significance to
understand the neural mechanisms of lying for rewards versus
lying to avoid punishment.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Ethics approval was obtained from the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Hong Kong/Hospital Authority Hong
Kong West Cluster before the study began. All of the participants
gave written informed consent for their participation. Fourteen
healthy volunteers were recruited from a local community to
participate in the study. All of the participants were male. Their
ages ranged from 25 to 39 years (Mean age= 29.44; SD=5.05),
and, on average, they had 16.4 years of education (SD=3.78).
They were screened for any history of neurological or mental
disorders and were assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory [70] as being right-handed. As one of the participants
could not complete the experiment, his data were not analyzed.
Table 4. Brain regions with significant BOLD activity in the
contrasts of Positive and Negative valence conditions in the
Lie condition.
Regions BA Side MNI Coordinates Cluster T
x y z
Positive.Negative (Lie condition)
Middle Frontal 45 R 46 44 20 13175 5.23
46 L 232 44 24 38 2.48
Insula 48 L 232 22 8 217 4.96
Posterior Cingulum 29 L 212 244 10 206 3.97
Fusiform 37 R 32 240 220 367 3.42
Thalamus - L 222 220 0 51 3.27
Lingual 19 L 228 262 22 54 3.04
18 R 16 276 22 37 2.14
Calcarine 17 L 210 286 4 291 2.97
Rolandic Operculum 48 R 44 6 16 18 2.7
Superior Occipital 18 R 220 272 34 63 2.66
Caudate - L 218 226 24 15 2.28
Negative.Positive (Lie condition)
Middle Temporal 37 L 240 268 12 332 3.89
39 R 50 270 14 247 3.55
Middle Frontal 45 R 44 30 32 93 3.21
Thalamus - L 24 216 20 93 3.19
- R 10 216 16 80 2.77
Angular 39 L 246 250 28 61 3.15
Precuneus 29 R 6 246 10 140 2.55
Hippocampus 30 L 218 226 210 13 2.4
Calcarine 19 R 32 252 10 27 2.14
Notes: All of the listed brain regions were cluster corrected at 12 contiguous
voxels and meet the threshold of p,0.05. The x, y, z coordinates are the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. BA is the abbreviation for the
approximate Brodmann’s areas; L is left; R is right. Cluster Size is the number of
voxels activated in the regional cluster; T is the t-values of the suprathreshold
voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.t004
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The findings of this study were therefore analyzed using the data
sets of 13 male participants.
Materials
Preliminary stimuli, consisting of 48 positive and 48 negative
emotion-eliciting pictures, were selected from the IAPS for the
participants’ rating task. The pictures were chosen based on the
IAPS standardized scores with matched valence and arousal levels
(Positive pictures: mean valence = 7.26, SD=0.63, mean arous-
al = 5.14, SD=0.59; Negative pictures: mean valence = 3.26,
SD=0.56, mean arousal = 5.21, SD=0.88). To minimize possible
cultural differences as well as individual differences in valence
perception, the final stimuli for the experimental set were selected
according to each participant’s ratings of the valence of the
pictures. Pictures with ratings over 6 on the 9-point scale (1 =most
negative; 5 = neutral; 9 =most positive) were chosen as positive
valence stimuli, and pictures with ratings lower than 4 were chosen
as negative valence stimuli.
Instructions
The participants were informed that this was a study of
deception. They were challenged to lie as skillfully as they could to
deceive our psychologist. The participants were also informed that
the experiment would involve components of both truth telling
and lying and that they should pay attention to the cues of
‘‘Truth’’ or ‘‘Lie’’ which appeared before each stimulus. When the
subjects were asked ‘‘How do you feel about the pictures? Positive
or Negative?’’ (the question appeared after a stimulus), they were
expected to respond as quickly as possible and in accordance with
the cues. For example, if the cue was ‘‘Truth’’ and the picture was
perceived as positive, they should respond by pressing the key
designated as ‘‘Positive’’. If the cue was ‘‘Lie’’ and the picture was
perceived as positive, they should lie about the perceived valence
of the picture and press the key designated as ‘‘Negative’’. The
response keys were counterbalanced to the participants’ right
index and middle fingers.
Procedure
The participants were first given the rating task in order to select
the experimental stimuli. The preliminary positive and negative
IAPS pictures were presented in a randomized order for the
participants to rate. Upon the presentation of each picture, the
participants were prompted to rate the picture, on a 9-point scale,
according to how positive/negative they felt about it (1 =most
negative; 5 = neutral; 9 =most positive). To ensure the proper
categorization of the positive and negative stimuli, the experimen-
tal stimuli were selected on the basis of the participants’ ratings.
After the rating task, the instructions for the experiment were
explained to the participants, together with a brief demonstration
of the experimental task. They were then given time to practice
Figure 3. Brain activation map for the contrast of Positive versus Negative valence in the Lie condition. 3a: Lie: Positive.Negative. 3b:
Lie: Negative.Positive. Notes: A =Anterior view; P = Posterior view; R = Right hemisphere; L = Left hemisphere; V = Ventral view; D=Dorsal view.
‘‘Negative’’ represents ‘‘Negative valence condition’’. ‘‘Positive’’ represents the ‘‘Positive valence condition’’. ‘‘Lie’’ represents the ‘‘Lie condition’’.
‘‘Negative’’ represents the ‘‘Negative valence condition’’. ‘‘Positive’’ represents the ‘‘Positive valence condition’’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.g003
Table 5. Conjunction analysis of Lie minus True in Positive





Superior Frontal 9/10 L 214 56 30 36 3.06
Inferior Orbital Frontal 47 L 232 24 210 11 2.12
Angular 39 L 238 256 26 12 2.07
Superior Medial Frontal 8 L 26 34 48 15 1.99
Notes: All of the listed brain regions were cluster corrected at 10 contiguous
voxels and meet the threshold of p,0.05. The x, y, z coordinates are the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. BA is the abbreviation for the
approximate Brodmann’s areas; L is left; R is right. Cluster Size is the number of
voxels activated in the regional cluster; T is the t-values of the suprathreshold
voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.t005
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with emotionally neutral pictures in order to familiarize themselves
with the speed and demands of the task.
An event-related design was used in the experimental paradigm.
There were 80 trials involving both truthful and deceptive
conditions. Half of the trials presented positive stimuli and the
other half presented negative stimuli in a randomized order. As
depicted in Figure 5, at the start of each trial, a visual cue (‘‘Truth’’
or ‘‘Lie’’) was presented for 1500 ms to indicate whether a truthful
or deceptive response was required. A picture was then presented
for 600 ms, and this was immediately followed by a fixation cross,
which appeared for 800 ms to allow time for the participants to
contemplate a response. After this, the question ‘‘How do you feel
Figure 5. The experiment included randomized truthful and deceptive conditions. There were 20 trials in each of the four conditions: (1)
True - Positive valence, (2) Lie – Positive valence, (3) True – Negative valence, and (4) Lie – Negative valence. Each trial consisted of a randomized cue,
either ‘‘Truth’’ or ‘‘Lie’’, for the True and the Lie condition, respectively. The cue appeared on the screen for 1500 ms. The participants then looked at
the picture for as long as 600 ms. A fixation cross appeared for 800 ms to allow the participants to prepare to make the correct response in
accordance with the cue. Then, the question ‘‘How do you feel about this picture?’’ was shown to prompt the participants to make either a truthful or
a deceptive response according to the cue. At the end of the trial, there was a randomized jittering (average 2500 ms) to separate the trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.g005
Figure 4. Brain activation map: conjunction analysis of contrast of Lie versus True in the Positive and the Negative valence
conditions. Notes: A =Anterior view; P = Posterior view; R = Right hemisphere; L = Left hemisphere; V = Ventral view; D=Dorsal view.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012291.g004
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about the picture?’’ appeared for 2000 ms to prompt the
participants to make a response in accordance with the cue.
Jittering, varying from 1500 ms to 3500 ms with an average of
2500 ms, was added between each trial to allow rapid event-
related randomized design. There were 40 trials for the Truth cue
and 40 trials for the Lie cue. The True/Lie cues were controlled in
order to combine with the Positive/Negative valence, such that a
262 within-subject factorial design was established, with 20 trials
for each of the following conditions: (1) True Positive, (2) True
Negative, (3) Lie Positive, and (4) Lie Negative.
Image acquisition
The experiment was conducted using a 3T Philip Achieva scanner
with a SENSE RF head coil with 8 channels. A T1-weighted spin-
echo pulse sequence was used to acquire structural images in a sagittal
orientation (TR=7 ms, TE=3.2 ms, Slice thickness= 1 mm), and a
T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging pulse sequence
(TR=1800 ms, TE=30 ms, FoV=230 mm6230 mm, Flip an-
gle=90u, Slice thickness= 4 mm,Matrix dimension=1286128) was
used to acquire functional images parallel to the AC-PC plane with
32 interleaved slices.
Data analysis
Image data were preprocessed and analyzed by the Statistical
Parametric Mapping software (SPM5, Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The functional scans of
individual participants were first realigned and slice-timed to
correct for temporal acquisition difference. The scans were
matched onto the participants’ respective structural images, which
were segmented into grey/white matter. The coregistered
functional scans were normalized to the SPM5 standard structural
template and smoothed with an 8 mm full-width half-maximum
Gaussian filter (FWHM). Hemodynamic response function (hrf)
was used in modeling the signal, and a high-pass filter of 128 s was
used to reduce low frequency noises. Individual contrasts among
the conditions were analyzed at the first level using the fixed effect
model. The results for individuals were then entered into the
second level for random effect analysis. To examine differences in
the neural correlates associated with the positive and negative
valence conditions, we defined four regressors as follows:
‘‘Positive’’ refers to trials where positive valence pictures are
viewed; ‘‘Negative’’ refers to trials in which negative valence
pictures were viewed; ‘‘Lie’’ denotes the conditions when
participants were cued to lie about the valence of the affective
pictures; and ‘‘True’’ refers to telling the truth with regard to the
perceived valence of the affective pictures. Contrasts of Positive
versus Negative valence in True conditions were set up in one-
sample t-tests to check the validity of the paradigm in identifying
the emotional difference. Contrasts of Lie versus True in Positive
and Negative valence conditions were entered into one sample t-
tests separately to explore deception in relation to different
emotions. A contrast on Positive versus Negative valence in Lie
conditions was conducted to examine the valence-related effect on
deception. Further, a conjunction analysis procedure was
conducted on the contrasts of Lie versus True in both the Positive
and Negative valence conditions in order to explore the neural
correlates of deception common to lying about the affectively
positive or negative IAPS pictures. The threshold was set at
p,0.05, with a cluster correction of 12 contiguous voxels, to
determine the level of statistical significance.
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